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THE KENNEDY- JOHNSON BOOM

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THE EDITORS

THE SCARS OF THE GHETTO

LORRAINE HANSBERRY

Quebec: Nationalism & the Working Class

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

In this issue we are announcing the early publication—in March we hope, but possibly in April—of a Supplement to MR. For details, please turn to pages 608-609. This is an experiment the future of which will depend on your reactions.

In our January Notes we made a plea to our readers for back issues of the magazine which are in short supply. The response in respect to the more recent numbers was gratifying; the earlier issues, however, are still

(continued on inside back cover)

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON BOOM

The business-political Establishment which runs this country has digested Keynesian economic theory and has begun to put it into practice. It likes the results. Listen to Douglas Dillon, Wall Street financier turned Secretary of the Treasury, speaking at the Harvard Business School last June 6th:

In the relatively short span . . . of less than three and one half years, both American economic policy and practice have taken new and dramatic turns for the better. Our economy is no longer on the wane—but surely and strongly on the rise. And we can now look forward, in all sober confidence, to the continuation of a peacetime economic recovery of greater durability and strength than in any comparable period in this century.

Equally important, the past three and one half years constitute a significant watershed in the development of American economic policy. For they have borne witness to the emergence, first of all, of a new national determination to use fiscal policy as a dynamic and affirmative agent in fostering economic growth. Those years have also demonstrated, not in theory, but in actual practice, how our different instruments of economic policy—expenditure, tax, debt management, and monetary policies—can be tuned in concert toward achieving different, even disparate, economic goals. In short those years have encompassed perhaps our most significant advance in decades in the task of forging flexible economic policy techniques capable of meeting the needs of our rapidly changing economic scene. (Treasury Department News Release.)

The achievement of which Mr. Dillon and his colleagues in business and government are proudest is a continuous and, relative to the immediately preceding years, high rate of growth of Gross National Product (GNP = total output of goods and services). In 1960, the last Eisenhower year, GNP was \$502.6 billion. Estimates for 1964 put the figure at \$624 billion. The increase in the four years of the Kennedy-Johnson administration was thus 24 percent—or, expressed as an average of the annual

increases, 5.6 percent per annum. This is unquestionably high by relevant historical standards, and it is scarcely surprising that it evokes hosannas from the Establishment's scribes and pundits. "Americans have received a \$40 billion lift this year," writes Edwin L. Dale, Jr., in the *New York Times* of December 26th. And he continues:

The \$40 billion represents the growth in the economy in 1964 over 1963, as measured by the gross national product. . . .

The growth in 1964 is nearly as large as the entire gross national product of Canada, which will be about \$45 billion this year.

It is about half the gross national product of France.

It is also . . . probably more than the Soviet Union's economy grew this year and last year combined, and possibly more than the last three years combined.

What government policies have contributed to this speeding up of the overall rate of economic growth? At first blush the answer might seem to be very simple, and entirely in accordance with Keynesian prescriptions: deficit financing. The record of federal government cash surpluses (+) and deficits (-) during the last five years is as follows (in billions of dollars):

1960	+3.6
1961	-6.8
1962	-5.7
1963	-4.6
1964	-5.2*

That a shift from budgetary surplus to deficit and the continuation of sizable deficits should, other things being equal, produce an acceleration of economic growth has by now attained the status of an axiom; it might seem therefore that the question is answered and there is little more to say except that Keynes and his followers have been proved right.

In reality matters are not quite so simple. The "other things being equal" proviso is an indispensable part of the axiom, and in practice other things rarely are equal. In fact, opponents

*Estimate based on first three quarters. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in this piece are from the December, 1964, issue of *Economic Indicators*, monthly publication of the Council of Economic Advisers.

of Keynesian policies, at least the more sophisticated among them, have always argued that deficit financing, if continued for any length of time, must have an adverse effect on other variables of the system and thus defeat its own ends. In particular, they reason that businessmen are a conservative lot who believe in balanced budgets, perhaps not every year but certainly over a period of years, and that therefore a continuation of deficits is bound to undermine their confidence and precipitate a decline in private investment. This did not happen during the last four years; on the contrary, business expenditures for plant and equipment are estimated to have been a good 25 percent higher in 1964 than in 1960, the last year of a (more than) balanced budget. What explains this apparent enthusiasm of businessmen for the policy of continuing deficits? This is evidently as important a part of the whole picture as the facts of the deficits themselves.

The approved answer to this question is that American businessmen have finally become enlightened. They have, so to speak, studied Samuelson's *Principles of Economics*, and they know that the supposed need to balance the budget is an old wives' tale. And so, when Kennedy brought the Keynesians to Washington with him, the stage was all set for the grand experiment: businessmen were not only ready to acquiesce but actively to cooperate.

There is undoubtedly something to this theory: the men who run the giant corporations which dominate the American economy have certainly shed the blinkers of old-fashioned fiscal orthodoxy. But this is not to say that they are enthusiastic about a policy of deficits as such. It is safe to assume that if at any time either Kennedy or Johnson had proposed to open up a deficit by sharply increasing expenditures of a "welfare state" variety while leaving taxes unchanged, the men of the corporations would have been strongly opposed; and if the program had nevertheless been adopted by the Congress (a most unlikely assumption of course), business confidence and private investment would undoubtedly have suffered in accordance with the anticipations of the traditional anti-Keynesian theory. In other words, it all depends on *what kind* of deficits are at issue. Once

we look at the matter from this angle, we shall have little difficulty in understanding the wholehearted enthusiasm of the Big Business community for the Kennedy-Johnson policy of deficits.

In the Harvard Business School speech quoted above, Treasury Secretary Dillon gives an account of the genesis and development of this policy. The problem when the Kennedy administration took office, he says, was "sluggish growth and inadequate incentives for investment. Postwar expansionary forces had been dissipated. Tax rates were siphoning off too much income to allow the private economy to reach full employment. The result was inadequate demand—with increased unemployment and evermore frequent recessions."

Under these conditions, a basic decision was taken to rely on fiscal policy. But this posed the "big question" which was "whether to increase government expenditures or to reduce taxes—or, to come to the heart of the matter: whether to rely upon the latent energies of the private sector or to expand government activity."

The reasoning at this point is crucial to an understanding of all that followed:

Larger government expenditures, if well timed, could, of course, have boosted demand and thereby cut unemployment. But unless such expenditures could be clearly justified on their own merits, their long-run contribution to productivity and investment would be uncertain at best. Thus they seemed to offer less benefit . . . than the path we chose: tax reduction.

The phrase "unless such expenditures could be clearly justified on their own merits" is obviously question begging, but in context its meaning is plain enough: unless those responsible for investment decisions approved, additional government expenditures could not be counted on to produce the desired expansionary effect. From the outset a veto power was conceded to the men of the corporations: the expansion of demand (deficit) would have to be achieved by methods tailored to their interests. Hence tax reduction, and hence also the kind of tax reduction decided upon. We return to this presently.

The decision to rely on tax reduction did not mean the renunciation of all increases in spending. In our system, it takes a long time to pass new tax legislation and still longer for it to begin working as intended. In the meantime, an increase in spending was urgently called for, with the proviso of course that it should be justified in the eyes of Big Business. Fortunately, from Mr. Dillon's point of view, there were in 1961 "overriding national priorities, all of which cost money: the need to bring our military defenses to a higher plateau of readiness, the special requirements of the Berlin crisis, the rapidly expanding space program. And, of course, the interest on the national debt." Yes, of course. These are the expenditures which are "justified on their own merits," and Dillon proudly boasts that the rate of increase of spending for arms, space, and interest on the national debt has been double that of the second Eisenhower administration. For all other purposes, he is equally proud to report, the increase in spending during the Kennedy-Johnson administration comes to "one third less than the comparable increase during the earlier 4-year period." In retrospect, Ike is beginning to look like a rabid pacifist and New Dealer!

While the full tax-cut program was in preparation, certain preliminary steps were taken. Let Dillon tell the story:

It was necessary to get the major increases in defense and space spending behind us before we could safely implement our full program of tax reduction. But rather than wait, we promptly undertook two major moves to improve the climate for business investment—moves that could be instituted without any excessive loss of revenue. They were the Revenue Act of 1962, with its central provision of a 7 percent investment tax credit, and the administrative liberalization of depreciation—both landmarks of progress in our drive to spur the modernization of our capital equipment. Together they increased the profitability of investment in new equipment by more than 20 percent. This was equivalent in terms of incentives to invest to a reduction in the corporate profits tax from 52 percent to 40 percent.

But, says Dillon, the "biggest impediment to a more robust private sector still remained—the high individual and corporate

income tax rates." The crowning act of policy was therefore the tax law of 1964, designed to "break the grip of these high tax rates on our economy"—and in the process distributing some \$11½ billion of largesse, mostly to the rich but with a sop to the little fellow thrown in as a political lubricant.

As a final assessment, Dillon approvingly cites a study by George Terborgh, an ultra-conservative economist at the Machinery and Allied Products Institute, which shows that the tax measures adopted in 1962 and 1964 by the Kennedy-Johnson administration will together have an effect on after-tax returns to capital comparable either to a cut in corporate income tax rates from 52 percent to 34 or 29 percent (depending on the ratio of equity to total capital), or to a reduction in the cost of new capital equipment of 16 percent. "It is hardly surprising," Dillon adds, "that investment activity is responding to incentives of this magnitude—even though it will be some time before the cumulative impact is fully realized—and that investment spending is now spearheading the recovery." Quite so, it is hardly surprising.

It is also hardly surprising that businessmen are so enthusiastic about *this kind* of deficit spending: boiled down to essentials it amounts simply to using the borrowing power of the federal government to subsidize corporate profits. But let no one be so naive as to conclude that some other kind of deficit spending—for example, the use of the government's borrowing power to provide decent jobs or incomes for the poverty-stricken, free medical services, good education—would command similar enthusiasm from the lords of the economy. Deficits incurred for *such* purposes would obviously be wasteful and confidence-destroying. And, as every right-thinking person knows, there could be no greater folly than to harm, or even threaten, that delicate plant which is the confidence of the billionaire corporations and the millionaires who run them.

Against this background, let us examine a little more closely the main characteristics of the great Kennedy-Johnson boom.

In the first place, the real beneficiaries have been, as intended, the corporations. Aggregate corporate profits after taxes

have increased as follows (in billions of dollars):

1960	22.0
1961	21.9
1962	25.0
1963	26.7
1964	32.0*

This, however, underestimates the real increase, since the liberalization of depreciation rules in 1962 enabled the corporations to shift approximately \$2.5 billion from (taxable) profits to (nontaxable) depreciation. If we make a rough adjustment by adding this figure to the totals for 1962 and later years, we find that the increase in profits from 1960 to 1964 was \$12.5 billion, or 57 percent. This is more than double the increase of GNP which, as noted earlier, was 24 percent in the same period.

Not all industries shared equally in this bonanza, of course. It is therefore worthwhile to cull out industry profit data from a 12-page news release issued by the White House on October 22nd (less than two weeks before the election) setting forth "a compilation showing some of the economic gains achieved by 12 major industries in the United States during the Kennedy-Johnson administration." The figures are percentage increases in after-tax profits during the four-year period 1961-1964, arranged in descending order of magnitude:

Motor vehicles and parts	120.3
Transportation equipment	89.9
Textiles	80.0
Non-electrical machinery	79.0
Nonferrous metals	46.0
Iron and steel	41.9
Chemicals	35.2
Petroleum	34.8
Paper and paper products	28.5
Electrical utilities	21.3
Food and beverages	17.6

Note: No profit figures are given for mining, which is the twelfth industry.

*Annual rate in the third quarter.

Wage-earners, even those fortunate enough to hold steady jobs, have done less well than even the least favored of these industries. Average weekly earnings in manufacturing went up only 15.8 percent between 1960 and the first three quarters of 1964. And if this is adjusted to take account of the 5 percent increase in consumer prices which has taken place since 1960, it will be seen that real weekly earnings have gone up only about 11 percent. During the same period labor productivity in the private economy is supposed to have risen by 3.6 percent a year, which aggregates to just over 15 percent for the four years.* Overall productivity figures of this sort, throwing together as they do all kinds of productive and unproductive labor, are not very meaningful and certainly vastly understate the increase in productivity of rationally organized production workers. Still they show that from labor's point of view, and judged even by the Establishment's own distorted standards, the Kennedy-Johnson administration could appropriately be labeled the Raw Deal.

But perhaps at any rate some progress has been made toward reducing the distressingly high rate of unemployment which developed in the late 1950's? Unfortunately, no. To be sure, the official unemployment rate shows a modest decline from 5.6 percent in 1960 to 5 percent (seasonally adjusted) in November 1964. But at the same time the number of people looking for work also declined so that what is called the labor force participation rate fell by 1.3 percentage points in the same period. If we assume that most of these dropouts from the labor force are as much unemployed as ever but have given up looking for jobs because they know from experience that none exist, we have to conclude that the true unemployment rate has risen to something over 6 percent after four years of uninterrupted expansion.

Nor are matters much better when it comes to the rate of utilization of the economy's material productive capacity. The McGraw-Hill index of capacity utilization stood at 81 in 1960 and rose slowly to 86 at the latest survey in September, 1964.**

*See Charles E. Silberman, "The Real News About Automation," *Fortune*, January 1965, p. 125.

**Periodic McGraw-Hill mimeographed releases, the latest dated November 6, 1964.

Overall, therefore, it appears that the slack in the economy today is as great as it was four years ago. And if we keep in mind the experience of the Second World War—when GNP nearly doubled at the same time that 10 million persons in the most productive age groups were being drafted into the armed forces—we can be sure that the commonly accepted measures of unemployment and unused capacity give no more than a faint inkling of what could be produced at the present time with a full, but not overstrained, utilization of available resources. It is surely well on the conservative side to assume that GNP could be rapidly expanded by \$100 billion, an increase of 16 percent over the present level. If this amount were distributed, directly and indirectly, to the two fifths of the nation living in poverty or deprivation, their real income would be doubled.* Such is the potential of the American economy. Such could be the *immediately* attainable goal of a real war on poverty.

The reality of course is entirely different. Far from disappearing, the problems of poverty and deprivation have grown along with the magnitude of corporate profits in the years of the Kennedy-Johnson boom. In New York City, for example, where so many of the giant corporations have their headquarters and so much of the nation's wealth is concentrated, the Department of Welfare is asking the city government to approve a budget for the next fiscal year of half a billion dollars, 20 percent more than its current budget and 15 percent of the total proposed expenditure by the city in the coming period. In justifying his department's request, Welfare Commissioner James R. Dumpson explained to the city's Budget Bureau that the larger amount was needed to care for the steadily rising number of people receiving public assistance.

The Commissioner said that the rise, which he put at about 5,850 a month, could be attributed to "chronic unemployment among the unskilled, low wages for many employed persons, the unavailability of sufficient low-cost housing, our failure to achieve

*In round figures, the lowest 40 percent of income receivers get about 20 percent of total personal income. At the end of 1964, total personal income was running at a rate of just over \$500 billion. The present personal income of those living in poverty and deprivation is therefore in the neighborhood of \$100 billion.

open occupancy for all people in available housing, increased cost of care for the medically indigent aged, and the continuing breakdown among families." (*New York Times*, December 29, 1964.)

But maybe this situation will be changed by President Johnson's war on poverty which, in his State of the Union Message, he promised to double in 1965? Well, maybe—a little. But Commissioner Dumpson has already made full allowance for that possibility. If the federal program is implemented, the rate of increase of welfare caseloads might be reduced by half. "If it were not for that possible reduction, he said, the department would have to ask for \$20 million more a year." (*Ibid.*)

The conclusion is inescapable: only the rich gain from the kind of boom which can be induced by methods acceptable to the business-political Establishment which rules this country today. The wages of the employed worker have not kept pace with gains in his own productivity. There are more, not fewer, unemployed. Poverty and deprivation are spreading like an unchecked cancer. There is, in truth, only one group President Johnson could have been referring to when he declared in his State of the Union Message: "We are in the midst of the greatest upward surge of economic well-being in the history of any nation." It is the group to which the multi-millionaire President himself belongs.

What about the future?

It is not our purpose to add one more "forecast" to the collection which crowds the news and financial columns at the turn of the year. It is enough to point out that not even the perennial optimists expect GNP to go on expanding at the rate of the last four years much longer. *Fortune* magazine, capitalism's most ardent apologist, says that "a new period, of subnormal growth, is now in prospect for the U.S. economy after this quarter. Following four years of rapid gains in output . . . this means a real change in trend. . . . The odds are still against recession in the next eighteen months, but the chances of it will be rising in 1966." (*Fortune*, January 1965, p. 27.) Others figure the odds differently, but let us suppose that *Fortune* is right and that what we face now is once again a period of sluggish growth such as characterized the late 1950's.

What cannot be overemphasized is that such a prospect, in the conditions of the 1960's, is little short of catastrophic. The labor force is today growing 50 percent more rapidly than it was a decade ago, and the speedup will continue for years to come. At the same time, automation is penetrating more and more areas of the economy—in no small measure, ironically enough, because of the tax-stimulated investment boom of the last few years—and will certainly be throwing more and more workers into the industrial reserve army in the period ahead. If a five-and-a-half percent rate of growth of GNP has been unable to hold the unemployment line, one can imagine what the consequences will be of a decline to, say, half that figure. Even without a recession, unemployment could easily reach the 10 percent level in the next couple of years. With a recession—and it would not have to be a severe one in terms of total output—we could be back where we were in the 1930's.

The somber truth is that this country is headed into a time of troubles from which there is absolutely no escape within the framework and confines of the capitalist system.

(January 8, 1965)

Oh, What a Lovely War!

President Johnson, in fighting poverty, is found to have revised his definition of a poverty-stricken family from one with \$3,000 of annual income to one with \$2,000 of income. This revision reduces the size of the poverty-war problem from one of 15 billion dollars to one of 5 billion dollars.

U.S. News & World Report, January 18, 1965

Capitalists personally are often the mildest-mannered men that ever shattered a family or drained a workingman of his marrow.

—*Daniel De Leon*

THE SCARS OF THE GHETTO

BY LORRAINE HANSBERRY

In April 1964, we visited Lorraine Hansberry in the hospital to tell her about the MR 15th Anniversary Committee's campaign to raise money to send MR Press books to Negro college libraries. We asked her to speak at the MR "birthday party" to be held on May 13 where announcement would be made of the total amount contributed. She said that though she was under doctor's care, she would leave the hospital on the night of the meeting to speak at the MR party.

She spoke at the meeting and returned to the hospital. On January 12, 1965, Lorraine Hansberry died of cancer. She was 34 years old. In memory of one of America's most distinguished playwrights and of a rare human being, we print below the speech she gave. The title is ours.
—The Editors

The most exciting and purposeful events which are presently and regularly occurring in our country are those which involve the efforts of the Negro people of the United States to wrest their birthright of full citizenship from a laggard and oppressive nation. It is, contrary to the myth, an old, old struggle. There isn't such a thing as the new Negro, if by that term we are made to understand that the present militant surge of the Negro people is without historical precedent. I make a point of saying this everywhere because it seems to me to need a great deal of emphasis. After all, even though it's not as well known as it should be, the Negro people have sustained one of the most heroic resistances to tyranny in the history of man. Our African ancestors came to the New World fighting slavery by mutiny on the high seas and by suicide. The very character of slavery in the United States was defined by the black man's repudiation of his enslavement, with which he daily did battle by sabotage, work stoppage, acts of violence against those who enslaved him, and of course, most telling of all, by running away by the thousands from slavery. And when the time came to give the fatal blow to the slave system, Negroes by the tens of thousands fell into the ranks of Lincoln's Union Army to serve in any way they could to destroy that hideous cancer

against human dignity that was the Confederacy. They served as cooks, spies, work battalions, thousands and thousands of men and women. Every moment that could be spared, the ex-slave begged and harassed his liberator to teach him the alphabet and figures. To know of the esteem in which education is held requires some intimacy with the cultural traditions and folkways of Negroes. Suffice it to say that black folk in America have historically regarded education with reverence. All the more poignant and ugly, then, that the withholding of education has been one of the prime instruments of the oppressors of American Negroes—oppressors who have seen to it that even when education could not be entirely withheld it could certainly be made substandard.

I am, for instance, the product of a Jim Crow grade school system. One result of that fact is that to this day I cannot count properly. This despite the fact that my reading scores as a grammar school pupil supposedly reflected the capabilities of the exceptional or so-called gifted child. Apparently something had to suffer. I was given during the grade school years one-half of the amount of education prescribed for each child by the Board of Education of my city. This was so because the children of the Chicago ghetto were jammed into a segregated school system. To this day, I do not add, subtract, or multiply with ease. Our teachers, devoted and indifferent alike, had to sacrifice something to make that system work at all, and in my case it was arithmetic which got put aside most often. Thus, the mind which was able to grasp university level reading materials in the sixth and seventh grades had not been sufficiently exposed to elementary arithmetic to make even simple change in a grocery store. This is what we mean when we speak of the scars, the marks that the ghetto-ized child carries through life.

To be imprisoned in the ghetto is at best to be forgotten, or at most to be deliberately cheated out of one's birthright. Equipment, books, actual building space are all cut back on when it comes to the ghetto child. I cannot, also for instance, swim. The reason for this is that there was no pool in our grade school, and a very poorly-equipped gymnasium. But here is the truly heart-breaking part. I am speaking of what was not then

an old building. On the contrary, it was a relatively new and modern building. It had been built that way purposely without a pool and with inadequate facilities; its substandard quality had been planned from the drawing board. From its inception it had been earmarked as a ghetto school, a school for Negro children, and therefore one in which as many things as possible might be safely thought of as expendable. After all, that's why the building was built, that's why the ghetto itself was and is maintained, not to give education but to withhold as much as possible, just as the ghetto exists not to give people homes but to keep them out of as much decent housing as possible.

If one is really to speak of the hatefulness of the oppressive system under which Negroes live, then no matter how much one despairs when one confronts such facts, one must do so, for at this moment the paramount crime in the United States is the refusal of its ruling classes to admit or acknowledge in any way the real scope and scale and character of their oppression of Negroes. That oppression is not a random, helter-skelter, hit-or-miss matter of discrimination here and there against people who just happen to be a different color. It's not that at all. It is, as that ruling class perfectly well knows, a highly concentrated, universal, and deliberate blanket of oppression pulled tightly and securely over 20 million citizens of this country.

This matter of admitting the true nature of a problem before setting about rectifying it, or even pretending to, is of utmost importance. It can not only save a great deal of suffering on the part of Negroes, but it can also save considerable embarrassment on the part of the rulers of this nation, for that is what their present course is destined for—the gravest embarrassment.

As we all know, there is something which we might call the “civil rights game” going on in this country, and it is being played right now in Washington. It is a game in which individuals, and indeed whole classes of individuals, who are in every way imaginable committed to the perpetuation of the oppression of Negroes, pretend for a whole variety of fashionable reasons that they are not. A portion of those who play this game go so far as to pretend that not only are they against the present condition of Negroes but they would like to alter

that condition for the better; and according to the rules of the game, they are designated by their co-players as civil rights champions and, depending on what is happening on a given day, they debate with one another on the best methods of stalling Negro demands for equality while appearing to be laboring in behalf of Negro equality. Naturally whenever Negroes assert that their situation is intolerable, these game-players point to the game which is going on and say that if those Negroes do not shut up they will stop playing altogether and reveal their true sentiments with regard to Negro freedom—which of course would be one of the healthiest things that could happen to this not-so-healthy country.

That is why I have come here this evening to celebrate with you the recognition of the fact that there is only one place from which that desperately needed pressure on the game is going to come when all is said and done. It's going to come from 20 million discontented black people who, however, must be led by a new and presently-developing young Negro leadership—a leadership which must absolutely, if the present Negro revolt is to turn into a revolution, become sophisticated in the most advanced ideas abroad in the world, a leadership which will have had exposure to the great ideas and movements of our time, a Negro leadership which can throw off the blindness of parochialism and bathe the aspirations of the Negro people in the realism of the 20th century, a leadership which has no illusion about the nature of our oppression and will no longer hesitate to condemn, not only the results of that oppression, but also the true and inescapable cause of it—which of course is the present organization of American society.

Surely there shall yet dawn some mighty morning to lift the veil and set the prisoned free. Not for me—I shall die in my bonds—but for fresh young souls who have not known the night and waken to the morning; a morning when men ask of the workman, not “Is he white?” but “Can he work?” When men ask artists not “Are they black?” but “Do they know?” Some morning this may be, long, long years to come.

—*W. E. B. DuBois*

VOICES OF SOCIALISM: KARL MARX

BY RALPH MILIBAND

Tribune, the organ of the Labor Left in London, has been running a series of sketches of famous socialists called "Voices of Socialism." The one on Marx, by Ralph Miliband, a frequent contributor to MR, impressed us as very well done both in style and content—a pleasure to read for those who already know Marx's life and works, and an admirable introduction for those who do not. We reproduce it here with the author's permission.
—The Editors

By vocation, Marx was not an economist, or a philosopher, or a sociologist. He was a revolutionary who, being deprived of the opportunity of participating in revolutions in the years after 1848, turned to the detailed analysis of the economic system he wanted to overthrow. Marx never ceased to stress the liberating quality of practical activity; but he himself was compelled by the circumstances of his time to devote most of his life to theoretical work.

Marx was 31 years old when he began, in 1849, an English exile which only ended with his death, nearly 35 years later. By the time he settled in London, he had already fashioned the new outlook which came, though not by him, to be called Marxism. In the previous half-dozen years, he had freed himself from the constrictions of the Hegelian philosophy he had learnt at the University of Berlin; in Paris, then the home of European socialism, he had assimilated the French revolutionary thought and experience of the previous 50 years; and he had also dug deep into English political economy: the work which he, with the help of Friedrich Engels, two years his junior, did in those few years, already includes all the main moral, economic, and political themes of his system; the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 is, in effect, the culmination, the summation of an intellectual effort which must rank as one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of ideas.

In the two decades following the defeat of 1848, Marx's main intellectual work was his attempt, as he describes it in the Preface to Volume I of *Capital*, published in 1867, to "lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society." From the foundation of the First International in 1864 until its virtual demise in 1872, Marx was also its leading figure, and it was in its name that he wrote, in 1871, his glowing tribute to the defeated Paris Commune and its tens of thousands of slaughtered defenders.

In all these years in England, Marx and the incomparable Jenny Marx and their children had endured the most bitter poverty, relieved only by Marx's occasional journalism and by Engels' unfailing help. By the early seventies, life had become easier; but Marx was plagued by ill-health, and he had, it would seem, lost the capacity for sustained writing. A mass of work which he had planned or started remained uncompleted, notably Volumes II and III of *Capital*, which Engels put together after Marx's death.

Engels, who survived him by 12 years, witnessed the rising tide of Marxian influence; Marx just missed it. All his life, he was a leader without a movement, a teacher with few disciples, quite unknown outside a narrow circle of socialists, most of whom were opposed to him anyway. In his own lifetime, there were probably fewer people who, in the whole wide world, thought of themselves as "Marxists" than are to be found today in Paris or Rome.

* * *

On the one hand, there is the Marxism of Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, and other Marxists. On the other, there is Marx's thought and work. The relation between Marx and Marxism is an interesting question, which has caused much ink to flow, and a lot of blood as well. But Marx, in any case, is not Engels, or Trotsky, or Mao Tse-tung, and there is certainly more than a hyphen which separates Marx from Leninism. In any case, later Marxism must be judged on its merits rather than with reference to Marx, the more so as he can, more or less plausibly, be quoted in support of many divergent positions. At the same time, it may at least be possible to distinguish

certain fundamental elements which lie at the core of his thought: whatever else authentic Marxism may be deemed to include, it needs to include these.

First of all, there is a certain way of looking at the world: Marx's first concern is with the material, concrete reality which lies hidden, as he believes, behind the religions, the ideologies, the moralities, which men create for themselves and for others out of ignorance, fear, or design. Marx's method, adapted from Hegel, is the dialectical method, or the search for the contradictory features of reality, the awareness of the many-sidedness of life and events, the consciousness of movement, conflict, change, impermanence—a method appropriate to a man who told his daughter that his “favorite motto” was “Doubt all things.”

Marx's dialectics must be clearly distinguished from the system known, though not to Marx, as “dialectical materialism.” This is the dialectics which Engels describes as “the science of the general laws of motion and development of Nature, human society and thought.” Marx does not use dialectics in this sense; nor, unlike his followers, did he make any universal claims for his work.

The reality which needs to be uncovered, Marx holds, has above all to do with men's material existence, with their economic life. At the beginning, there is neither the word, nor even the deed, but hunger and need. In their struggle for existence, men enter into certain relationships with each other. For most of history down to the present, these relations have had as their main characteristic the domination of the few over the many, of slave-owner over slave, of feudal lord over serf, of capitalist over wage-earner, the few appropriating the largest possible part of that which the many produce. Modes of exploitation have varied from epoch to epoch—but exploitation itself has endured. Reforms within a system of exploitation are possible, but do not affect its character as a system of exploitation. This can only be done on the basis of the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production.

Class domination and class conflict are two sides of the same coin. Now acute and violent, now latent and subdued, class

conflict is the driving force of history, the way in which men make their history; its extreme manifestation is revolution.

In class conflict, the state is not neutral. On the contrary, its principal purpose is to offer protection to the economically and socially dominant class. Nor does that class only seek to protect itself by physical force; it also relies on its control of the "mental means of production" and upon the socially soporific influence of ideologies of resignation and accommodation, of which religion is only one expression.

Marx was a remarkably flexible thinker, save in one respect—his absolute certainty that capitalism was no more permanent than the social systems which had gone before it. Its supersession, he said, was not only desirable but inevitable, above all because there lay at its heart a "contradiction" which could only be resolved by its abolition; with the development of capitalism, "the monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

Marx did not exclude the possibility that the proletarian revolution he announced might be peaceful, but it is quite clear that he expected it to be violent. It is equally clear that revolution, for him, is above all the business of the class-conscious proletariat, whose dictatorship it installs. The "dictatorship of the proletariat," in Marx, is not the rule of an elite or a party on behalf of the people: it is rule by the people, their actual running of society. The model depends upon the existence of the class-conscious proletariat as a dominant force: in the absence of such a force, it undergoes fundamental modifications.

The abolition of capitalism does not usher in the "truly human" society; it only makes it possible. As for the character of that truly human, classless, society, Marx consistently refused to speculate on it: it is for those who will make that society to define its features. But the vision which underlies his whole

work, from the early 1840's to the end, is the vision of human liberation, of which material fulfilment is the condition but not the sum. Ultimately, this is what Marx, the mature Marx as well as the "young Marx," is about—life against existence.

* * *

There are many loose threads in Marx's work: his economic analysis, his theory of capitalist crisis, his theory of the state and of classes, his model of social change, the relation between "material base" and "superstructure," in brief, all the most important aspects of his work yield large questions rather than neat solutions. This, however, is not Marx's weakness but his strength, save to religious minds. For the questions to which he compels attention, and which his work illuminates, are at least as relevant now as when he asked them; and so is the challenge he poses.

The Victorian era was a great era for explorers. Marx was the greatest and boldest of them all. No one has so far provided a better point of entry into the jungle of social analysis. But having entered, those who follow him are on their own, and must make their own way.

A bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.

—Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 178

A healthy civilization implies a double action—the action of great bodies of men moving with the broad stream of their age, and eventually governing their leaders; and the action of men of genius or heroism upon the masses, raising them to a higher level, supplying them with nobler motives or more comprehensive principles, and modifying, though not altogether directing, the general current.

—W. E. H. Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. 2, pp. 405-406.

QUEBEC: NATIONALISM AND THE WORKING CLASS

BY PIERRE VALLIERES

For some time Quebec, the French-speaking underdeveloped province of Eastern Canada, has begun to make itself heard in the newspapers of the whole world. What is going on in Quebec? A revolution? Bombs burst last year in Montreal. A hundred thousand farmers marched on the Quebec parliament in the spring. Students and unions also marched on the Quebec capital. The Prime Minister, Jean Lesage, head of the Quebec provincial government, sent off several ultimatums to the government in Ottawa; and he recently warned the Anglo-Canadians in the rest of Canada that special status will soon have to be accorded to Quebec or, according to him, the political situation there might take a serious turn.

The local powers-that-be are already alarmed. In Quebec, as well as in Ottawa, the federal capital, the means are being sought to suppress or at least to soften the demands of the French-speaking community of Quebec which, for the first time in its history, is manifesting so clearly and categorically its determination to seize what belongs to it; to be no longer content with seeking alms from the federal government; to be used no longer, through the payment of very high taxes, to finance the industrialization of Ontario*; but instead to seek true self-determination by the recovery of its economic, political, and social rights which have been systematically ignored since the conquest of New France by the English in 1760.

Pierre Vallières is a young Canadian journalist on *La Presse* of Montreal and is also an editor of *Révolution Québécoise*. The article has been translated from the French by Perry Sturges.

*For example, a major part of the taxes go to armaments. Quebec, the second most populous province of Canada (after Ontario), pays a significant share of these taxes which Ottawa uses to award contracts to arms factories most of which are situated in Ontario. All these millions of dollars stolen from the people of Quebec for the defense of the American "free world"!

The nationalism which is so evident at the present time, although deformed by propaganda spread by the Quebec bourgeoisie which wishes to utilize it for its own advantage, contains a social protest and precise economic demands which, as they become wider and more deeply felt, could one day break out into a socialist revolution. For this nationalism is directed against the whole gamut of alienations which the people of Quebec suffer, and it has a goal which is much wider and more concrete than simple political demands.

Who are these North American people who were unknown yesterday and who are today causing jitters among capitalists who fear another Cuba to the North?

A detour into history is necessary to understand what is going on in northeast America.

In the 17th century New France was a settlement and at the same time a source of commercial wealth for France. We are at the beginning of French colonization in America: Champlain founded Quebec in 1608. Maisonneuve and some mystics founded Ville-Marie (Montreal) in 1642. Three groups shared the power in Quebec at that time: the Church, which sought a settlement of colonists in order to better achieve its domination of men's minds; the commercial companies, which came into direct conflict with the ecclesiastical powers, particularly because of their sale of brandy, which was condemned by the Church; finally the national petty bourgeoisie, made up in large part of nobles and "gentlemen" who had lost their places at Versailles. The latter were liberals who disliked the Jansenism of the clergy: together with the commercial companies they had enough authority to prevent the Church—whose role in the colony had been, for some time, approaching theocracy—from controlling "the good Catholic people of New France."

But in 1760, immediately following the conquest by the English, everything changed: the majority of the elite returned to France and those who remained, compromised increasingly by their "flirtation" with the conquerors, saw their prestige diminish. It was at this point that the Church alone appeared capable of opposing the English through the creation of a coherent, solid, and unified image of the French Catholic society of

Quebec. The Church put down its roots in the rural parishes where the majority of the French-speaking population lived (about 70,000 inhabitants at the time of the conquest). There, it brought to the Quebec nation its first ideological outlines, emphasizing the character of Catholicism above all else. In the absence of the elite, which had to become to a certain degree "English" in order to survive, the Church took control of education and thereby control of the whole society. As the only educated element, enjoying "divine prestige," the Church received from the ignorant and humiliated people the mandate to negotiate with the conquerors. It took advantage of the situation to obtain from the English strong guarantees in the religious area in exchange for the passivity and submission of the people, for which the Church offered itself as guarantor.

For the clergy it was the same thing to preach submission to God and submission to the English conquerors, since all authority came from God, as they said in Church.

Loyalty became the required virtue, and this virtue was reinforced a little later by the threat from America. Canadians, both French and English, soon were struggling against the common enemy (in 1812). But once that danger had passed, quarrels between the two ethnic groups were rekindled. In spite of the efforts of the clergy, loyalty was difficult for the people. It was difficult also for the petty bourgeoisie which had graduated from the seminaries (the only colleges of that period). In fact, at the beginning of the 19th century there appeared a bourgeoisie indigenous to Quebec, made up of poor young men who, after finishing their education in the seminaries, entered the liberal professions: notaries, lawyers, doctors. Very soon they insisted that the conquerors accord them their share of jobs in government, in business, and in public life. To the opposition of "races" was added a struggle of interests.

But at the same time, the petty bourgeois professionals began a struggle against the Church whose power harmed their interests as much as did the Anglo-Canadians' desire for assimilation. The middle classes became anti-clerical and exchanged their traditional nationalism (under which religion was considered the guardian of their language) for the democratic ideal which was

taking shape in England and the United States. Their leader, Papineau, made frequent voyages to London and wanted the much wider participation of his people in the economy and in the politics of a liberal system. Papineau appeared, in the eyes of the clergy, to be a diabolical atheist since he admired the French Revolution.

In 1837, the struggle between the middle classes of Quebec and the triumphant Anglo-Saxon bourgeoisie ended in a vast rebellion. But this revolt, which was not supported by the clergy, ended in total defeat. It was then that the Quebec middle classes had to make a decisive choice: declare for the creation of a Quebec nation and accept the Church as the backbone of the society, or join the Anglo-Saxon world to free themselves from the Church and the Inquisition. As the sociologist Fernand Dumont maintained recently, these liberals "decided to choose nationhood and that choice brought a number of consequences: especially, there would be no violent political revolution."

After 1840 the struggle against the Church was eliminated, and the latter came to provide, more completely than after the conquest of 1760, the framework of Quebec. To this choice, made in favor of the Church by a respectful middle class, was added the choice for nationalism as the highest expression of liberty. This choice, both nationalist and clerical, took place before industrialization of the province began and found its support in a peasant society reared on stable, conservative, and medieval values.

Peace was established between the two Canadas, and the Confederation of 1867 consecrated the coalition of the middle classes of the two ethnic groups, a coalition brought about by the Treaty of Union of 1840 (which, from the English point of view, would aim at the complete assimilation of French Canadians) and by the common fear of American conquest.

The fundamental outlook of the professional bourgeoisie of Quebec gradually changed. Once liberal, it became conservative, drew upon the values of the peasantry, and viewed the budding industrialization with scorn. Society was considered a vast family. The clergy and the middle class joined slowly as allies to develop a widespread paternalism which, for 100 years,

would prevent the people of Quebec from breathing free air. Accepted by the Anglo-Saxon world, the clergy and the professional bourgeoisie, instead of participating in the development of North American capitalism, adopted a clearly reactionary attitude for that period and refused wealth (that is, the economic development of Quebec) in the name of a spiritual calling: that of giving a Christian and evangelical soul to imperialist America!

Their fear of business during that period resembled the fear of making love. They were ashamed of foreign industries which, in spite of everything, took root on Quebec soil, and they were ashamed of the increasing urbanization of the land. They feared the city. The city, for many, represented loss of faith and loss of one's language, since business was conducted in English and directed by Protestants. The priests preached return to the land, and colonies were founded in the virgin (but poor) lands of Quebec: Abitibi, Lac St. Jean, Gaspésie. These were among the most underdeveloped regions of Quebec.

This reactionary and stupid course ended in disaster: hundreds of thousands of people were driven into poverty because they had fled the city on the advice of the Church and the government. Hundreds of thousands of others who came in to swell the population of the cities, particularly Montreal, sought work without having technical qualifications or education. All initiative in the economic domain was left in the hands of the materialist Anglo-Saxons, and only a very small number of middle-class inhabitants of Quebec were willing to dirty themselves in industry or commerce.

With the approval of the Quebec elite, the federal regime, instituted in 1867, operated for the unique profit of Anglo-Saxon Canadians, particularly those living in Ontario.

Nevertheless, Quebec did build an industrial base, or rather an industrial base was built for it through the extension of American capitalism. The latter profited from the absence of governmental control to grab mines, land, forests, processing and distributive industries. The Anglo-Canadians were accomplices in this appropriation, the Quebec bourgeoisie having to content itself with pocketing minor dividends.

As for the people, sermons continued to urge them to return

to the land, at least until the day when the North American capitalists would offer the workers buying power giving them the illusion of economic security and personal well-being. After 1945 the economic conquest of Quebec was practically complete, and the land was being deserted for the city. The people of Quebec became a great reservoir of labor for Yankee imperialism. After that the Church no longer preached loyalty to the land or to the conquering English, but loyalty to private enterprise.

The "forced" industrialization of Quebec brought profound changes in the mentality and behavior of a constantly increasing number of Quebec citizens, and this was true at all levels. The bourgeoisie, especially its youngest elements, began to develop a taste for business, and the cooperative movement underwent a great expansion. Capital accumulation by Quebec citizens began to take place, and people began to talk about "buying at home" and about French-Canadian business.

For their part, the workers began to organize seriously. Grouped at first in shop committees (*syndicats de boutiques*) in order to counterbalance the influence of the neutral (a-religious) American unions—which American corporations trail behind them—more and more workers in Quebec learned to carry on the struggle against management effectively. Beginning in the forties, they organized unions more outspoken in their demands. (However it was not until about 1960 that the Catholic unions were to be officially separated from the Church.) Repeated strikes developed a pre-revolutionary consciousness and, little by little, created conditions for the generalized struggle of the working class against capitalism.

But the ignorance of the masses and the influence of the Church prevented the workers' first steps from succeeding. American anti-Communism spread rapidly through Quebec; at the same time the international (Yankee) labor movement was used by the governments in Quebec and Ottawa to destroy the influence of radical union leaders who had taken control of the big unions such as the maritime, clothing, and textile unions. Hal Banks and his friends "saved" Quebec from Communism and brought in union gangsterism. Fortunately the Catholic labor movement, although reactionary, has not undergone the corrup-

tion which began, at that time, to invade the American movement.

In 1945, foreign trusts in Quebec continued to represent a problem; and Maurice Duplessis, head of the National Union, declared war on them. The people, in a moment of delirium, brought him to power. He stayed there 15 years, using xenophobic, anti-Communist demagoguery to keep Quebec outside the mainstream of history. At the same time that he talked about provincial autonomy, he sold the Americans whatever they hadn't yet succeeded in getting their hands on. He left the clergy to dominate education, and he made agreements with the central government in Ottawa which were disadvantageous to Quebec.

These 15 years of darkness favored the birth of a liberal "Left" which, like that of 1840, became anti-nationalist out of disgust, and federalist out of its taste for liberty. This "Left" did not question the capitalist system, only the extremely reactionary politics of Duplessis and the Church. Made up of "liberal" Catholics, this "Left" preached equality of laymen and clergy and sought from the federal departments (National Film Office, Radio Canada) a kind of political asylum where they could work in an intelligent modern way.

Public opinion considered that the movement against Duplessis was socialistic. This explains why, in 1960, when the liberals came to power, it was thought for a while that the revolution had arrived. People quickly realized, however, that "left-wing" ideas, once in power, were not in the least revolutionary. The Lesage government, which has been in office 4 years, is only trying to drag Quebec from a feudal regime to modern capitalism, parasitic though it may be.

Quebec Today

Today American capital controls about 90 percent of the economy of Quebec. The business class of Quebec is so dependent that it cannot count on its own strength to compete with foreigners; it cannot help sliding into the least profitable sectors of production nor can it resist the absorption of its companies by monopolies.

The middle class is obliged to appeal to the state which has created on its demand a financial corporation to keep it going. This private company, subsidized from taxation, exists for the purpose of helping build capitalism in the province of Quebec, which will then be able to take a relative pride in a certain amount of independence—an independence more political than real, for the business class is in general agreement with the theories of the Quebec Minister of Revenue, Eric Kierans (former President of the Canadian Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange of Montreal) who said recently: “Foreign investments do not constitute an impairment of the sovereignty of Quebec because the corporate leaders cannot go against and are not going against the desires of French Canada whose government in Quebec is the supreme political expression. . . .” (*Le Devoir*, November 20, 1964). For this Minister, as well as for the whole middle class, the field must be left free to foreign (especially American) capitalists who manifest a desire to invest in Quebec; for political authority is superior, according to the managerial classes, to economic power. “These days,” it is said, “it is the government which shapes the development of a country, and not the capitalists.” This theme has no other aim than to mystify the masses by making them believe that the government is different from and superior to the economic regime. In fact we know very well that this is in no way true; that, on the contrary, governments are the servants of the capitalist regime and that this is just as true in the era of the “directed economy” and of economic programming as it was in the era of classical economic liberalism.

The Quebec bourgeoisie can strengthen its present cohesion and its privileges as the dominating class only through its dependence on foreign (American) capital, and by hardening its capitalist ideology. It will never be able, as the African and Latin American middle classes may be, to play the kind of role in the economic development of Quebec once played by the middle classes in Europe. Its future is irreparably tied to that of foreign monopolistic capital and to the systematic exploitation of the working class. That is why the only separatism that the working class can support is separation from North American

capitalism and the secession of Quebec by the adoption of socialism. But is that eventuality near?

The Working Class

Quebec nationalism, which appeared following the Liberal victory of 1960, has been and remains a middle-class phenomenon. However, this nationalism encounters the growing anger of urban and rural workers, anger they feel simultaneously toward both forms of government which capitalism makes use of to enslave the people. This dual power, in existence since the Confederation of 1867, is both provincial and federal, and it was instituted by the British, with the complicity of Quebec leaders; it had the clear aim of preventing a political conquest of Canada by Americans, and it used the spirit of loyalty of the "two founding peoples of the country" in order to exploit Quebec, poor and vanquished, to the advantage of Ontario, rich and victorious. The discrimination exercised toward the people of Quebec, in the name of sacrosanct respect for the "divinely ordained" Confederation, has ceased to be, for the masses, a fate against which nothing can be done. In the same way, the traditional cowardice of successive governments in Quebec has ceased to be profitable for the local bourgeoisie.

The response of the government and middle class to the growing dissatisfaction of the people is "political sovereignty." Almost everyone agrees on the goal, but the terms and conditions of that sovereignty are not yet settled. Some speak of an Associated State, others of total political independence. But the formula in no way changes reality, which may be summed up as follows: the managerial classes are capitalist and do not want to break with monopoly capital. Quite simply, they want to be as well treated as the managerial classes of English-speaking Canada.

Faced with the policies of the bourgeoisie, the working class has no other choice than to mobilize all its energy for a wide attack on the capitalist system. Workers do not have to support the "nationalist" demands of the middle class, demands which are intended to lull the masses and to mobilize popular sentiment for the achievement of ends radically opposed to the workers' interests. Nevertheless, the independence movement is awakening

a people who have been too long cut off and asleep; it is obliging workers, as well as others, to examine their position; it is forcing the whole of the population to question their society.

But the bourgeoisie and the proletariat see the question from opposite points of view. Whereas, for the bourgeoisie, nationalism is a means of increasing the privileges of a minority, for the workers it is but a part of the development of the revolution in Quebec.

Today Quebec is a country of nearly 6 million inhabitants, of whom 85 percent are French speaking. This country is free neither politically nor economically. For two centuries it has been colonized by foreigners, and it has never had a word to say in determining its own history. Now for the first time a strong will to direct its own affairs has become evident. For the local bourgeoisie it is a matter of bringing Quebec into the modern capitalist era, and a matter of using the state so that they may hold their own against their Anglo-Saxon neighbors in Ontario. For the working class this objective holds no interest whatever. For it, what matters is true liberation through a radical change in the relations of production. But if it cannot count on the local bourgeoisie to help it make a proletarian revolution, the working class can freely support the middle classes of Quebec in the struggle against economic and political discrimination practised by the Anglo-Saxon bourgeoisie, because that struggle as Lenin would have said, has "a general democratic content directed against oppression."

The danger in Quebec now is that the working class does not yet realize sufficiently clearly that it is the only truly national class, and it has not yet really decided to form a revolutionary party aiming at achieving truly national objectives. The present unions must bear a large measure of blame for this state of affairs, for, by their refusal to act politically and by their unconditional acceptance of capitalism, they contribute to the reinforcement among workers of that feeling of powerlessness, of uselessness and humiliation, with which, up to now, only the Party of Social Credit has dared to break. (The Social Credit Party is a reactionary party in the style of Goldwater, but unlike "Goldwaterism" has been opposed to the greatest enemy of

Quebec's wage-earners, the big corporations.) No party, no movement represents, at the present time, the Quebec workers. The unions, dominated for the most part by the American internationals, no longer have any vitality. As for the Confederation of National Unions, the only workers' organization authentically based in Quebec, claiming 140,000 workers, it needs a house-cleaning and it needs to be steered toward radical action by militants who are politically sophisticated.

Will a revolution emerge one day from the nationalist movement in Quebec? Even if the English-speaking Canadians and the Americans concede independence to the Quebec bourgeoisie in order to preserve, through the services of the latter, their capitalist interests, a long road will still remain to be traveled from constitutional independence to complete independence and, beyond that, to socialism. It would be a dangerous setback for Quebec if political independence, sought by the middle class, meant, soon afterwards, even greater limits than exist now on the fundamental objectives of the workers, and a retreat of the liberation movement of the people of Quebec in return for a new period of political alienation.

Only the formation and development of an antagonistic class consciousness among those layers of the population which are most discriminated against will permit Quebec to avoid the fate presently in store for the Latin American republics, or outright annexation to the United States. It is a matter of urgency to create a revolutionary party in Quebec which will be capable of seeking true national liberation right to the end, that is, to the point of gaining power and of establishing a socialist regime able to achieve true independence. Nowhere else in North America are the chances of revolution any better than in Quebec. Will socialists be adequate to the task with which history entrusts them? Will they have the honor of successfully directing, one day, the first socialist revolution in North America?

Announcement

Sixteen years ago when we were planning MONTHLY REVIEW, one of the questions we had to decide was whether it should include what is called, in publishers' parlance, a "back of the book" devoted to literature and the arts. We decided against. For one thing we did not feel competent to do a good job on the editorial side; and, no less important, we did not think we could count on the collaboration of enough serious Marxist critics to sustain an arts section meeting the standards we intended to set for MR as a whole.

These reasons by their very nature carried the implication that we might some day change our minds. And when Frances Kelly came to work with us two years ago, the first reason lost its force. She had been the Business Manager of the *New Left Review* in London, and her field of special interest and competence is the arts. But we were not sure whether the second reason had also ceased to operate, although we knew that there had been something of a renaissance of radical thought among young people, especially in the larger universities. We were therefore uncertain whether the time had come to introduce a back-of-the-book section, and in this state of uncertainty we decided to try an experiment—a cultural supplement under Frances Kelly's editorship.

At least it was called a cultural supplement during the months that went into its planning and organization. It has turned out to be something a little different from that. A number of the articles which are included would probably be better described as sociological, political, historical, philosophical—or some combination of these adjectives. Except for their length several of them could have appropriately been included in a regular issue of MR. So finally we decided to drop "cultural" and just call it a supplement. Most of the material is oriented toward literature and the arts, but this is simply a matter of emphasis. And it is of course wholly in keeping with MR's Marxist inspiration, for Marxism recognizes no rigid distinctions in the whole area of knowledge and communication.

Whether this supplement will be followed by others—or by other forms of experimenting in broadening MR's coverage—will depend entirely on the reception it is accorded, both critical and financial.

Leo Huberman
Paul M. Sweezy

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During the months of planning the Supplement, we have received much encouragement from present and future contributors. Now we need *your* support. Review 1 will be at least 96 pages, have a sewn binding and a stiff cover. The list price will be \$1 per copy (Associates will get it free).

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Will the Dollar Be Next?

Our review of *World Events* in the January MONTHLY REVIEW began with a statement on the instability of the pound sterling as an international currency. We noted that international transactions in the capitalist world use the pound sterling and the dollar interchangeably and collectively, so that anything which influences one is bound to influence the other. We also remarked on the anxiety felt in the United States lest the pound sterling be devalued with disastrous consequences for international economic relations.

When speculators began selling pounds in October, 1964, they were anticipating devaluation and putting themselves in a position to profit by it. Without doubt some selling was directed against the "socialist" Labour government which had just won its election by a slender margin.

United States reaction was prompt and extensive. Washington not only came to the aid of the pound, it also rounded up ten other Western governments to underwrite the pound with a \$3 billion loan.

At the time there was some *sotto voce* murmuring about the instability of the dollar as an international currency. *U.S. News & World Report* (December 7) wrote about the perilous position in which the dollar found itself. United States gold reserves, said the editors, were down to \$15.6 billion and were declining. The gold required to back United States currency was \$13.2 billion, leaving a "free" gold balance of \$2.4 billion. Foreign-held demand claims against the "free" gold were \$26.1 billion, and were increasing. Hence, if foreign claimants demanded gold (which they might do legally), only one-twelfth of the claims would be satisfied before the United States "free" gold supply was exhausted. Even the gold used to back the currency would meet only half of the foreign claims.

Consequently, wrote the *U.S. News* editors, any action that

caused a loss of confidence in the dollar might lead foreign claimants to sell dollars, convert their holdings into harder currencies, and wipe out Washington's gold reserve almost overnight. "That's why it was so fast to shore up the British pound when it faced trouble."

This is not the whole story. In addition to a currency volume of some \$38 billion, mostly in paper, the Washington government has a debt in excess of \$315 billion in notes and bonds, which are likewise "paper." Also the Washington government has guaranteed or insured bank deposits, savings and loan accounts, home mortgages, public housing bonds, and other minor projects to a total amount of \$347 billion. Further, the federal government carries an obligation on social security account that is presently estimated at more than \$625 billion. Add together these three figures: public debt, \$316 billion; insurance and guarantee of private debt, \$347 billion; and social security commitment, \$625 billion—and you get the tidy sum of \$1,288 billion. To meet these debts there is no visible means available except an increase in taxes, a devaluation of the dollar, or a federal budget surplus.

Two other items require notice. First, Washington's consistent spending in excess of its income, which adds billions of dollars of debt each year. Second, the yearly deficits in United States international payments add billions each year to the foreign claims against dwindling United States gold reserves. These obligations are increasing with every passing year. This debt cannot be met. It will be repudiated or paid off in devalued dollars.

Looked at from a European point of view, neither the pound nor the dollar is a strong dependable currency. An unnamed Swiss banker was quoted by *U.S. News* (December 7) as saying:

The dollar and the pound are regarded as the weakest of the major currencies. The Swiss franc, German mark, Dutch guilder, and French franc are regarded as the world's safe currencies. If confidence is shaken, speculation will send money flowing into these safe currencies. This could lead to chaotic conditions in foreign exchange and in money markets—and a collapse of mutual confidence and the most serious slump in business since World War II.

Before 1914, major currencies were based on gold reserves that were considered sufficient to meet all emergencies. Over-spending, excessive borrowing, and financial strains during the war of 1914-1918 depleted gold reserves, skyrocketed debts and taxes, and brought inflated prices, devaluation and abandonment of some currencies, and serious upsets in international business. Disorganization was even greater during the war of 1939-1945. Twenty years after the war's end, in 1965, international capitalist finance teeters on crumbling foundations built upon the two weakest of the world's major currencies. During the last ten years, insecurity has become greater rather than less.

When will the course of world events convince mankind that no one or two nations can dominate international finance any more than one or two nations can dominate the political life of the planet?

Is it not obvious that trading, lending and borrowing, traveling, and other forms of rapidly growing international economic activity require a planet-wide system of money and credit, organized, sponsored, and supervised by a world government with sufficient delegated power to administer a world economy and a world society?

How Secure Is Social Security?

After many bitter experiences with money and credit, modern man has provided himself with legal safeguards which limit the actions of private banks, trust companies, insurance companies, and loan associations. In all cases the business in question is compelled to maintain sufficient reserves to meet maturing obligations. Such protection is not catastrophe-proof; but so long as the reserves are maintained, individuals have some protection.

Recently governments have entered the insurance field, with their own systems of social security. In the United States, since the hard years that began in 1929, Washington has built up a social security apparatus upon which some 95 million persons depend, more or less, for their livelihood. Roughly 75 million persons pay social security taxes, and 20 million are drawing pensions from the Social Security Administration.

There are two sources from which social security funds are derived. The first is a tax on wages and salaries, half paid by the employer and half by the worker. A second source of social security funds is Congressional appropriations.

Social Security authorities maintain a trust fund from which pensions are paid. Ten years ago, when the fund was set up, it was estimated that by 1965 it would amount to \$28.5 billion. In 1964 the official estimate of the Social Security Fund was \$22 billion.

We are indebted for much of this information to an article "How Safe is Your Social Security Pension?" and a long quoted interview with Robert M. Ball, United States Commissioner of Social Security, in *U.S. News & World Report* of December 7, 1964. We have accepted Ball's figures at their face value because we are not concerned with the amount of the obligations so much as with the reserves and guarantees behind the obligations.

Ball admits that the ratio of the Social Security Fund to the outstanding obligations has declined considerably in recent years. Questioned about the dependability of the Fund, Ball insisted that it was large enough, supplemented by Congressional enactments, to take care of the social security obligations which the federal government has assumed.

Closely questioned about the results of another depression on the reliability of social security, Ball asserted that it had proved adequate to meet the depressions that had occurred since the Fund was set up. Pressed by the interrogator as to whether the Fund would meet the requirements of a depression such as the one which began in 1929, the Commissioner answered: "I don't think anybody contemplates that the United States will again get into a situation where a quarter of the labor force is unemployed."

As to the stability of the Fund under inflationary pressures, Commissioner Ball insisted that the present social security apparatus is "inflation proof."

Questioned about the assets of the Social Security Fund, he stated that they consisted of Federal Government bonds.

Question: The government, in other words, has borrowed the money?

Answer: Yes, and put up bonds for it.

Question: So the money has been spent, and is not there in the Fund at all?

Answer: It is true. . . . The Fund, instead of holding cash, holds government bonds, and earns a return on those bonds. . . . To the same extent that government's credit is good, the Social Security Fund is sound."

Without going further into the Social Security Fund's ability to meet its obligations, we wish to call attention to the fact that the government has collected billions of dollars in Social Security taxes, placed part of the tax money in a reserve fund, borrowed and spent the cash and put in its place an equivalent of IOU's bearing the signature of the borrower—the United States government.

Laws regulating the investment of trust funds or other required reserves would not permit such procedures on the part of any private enterprise. Only the government could finance in such an irresponsible fashion.

Does Castro Hold the Key?

Seldom has a British Queen twice gone out of her way to honor the Prime Minister of a Crown Colony. Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana enjoys that distinction. In 1953 and again in 1964, Queen Elizabeth II convened a State Council which issued executive orders under which the Guianese constitutions were modified in such a way as to deprive Dr. Jagan of his office as Prime Minister.

Jagan's second expulsion from office was particularly raw. Since he had won a plurality in three consecutive elections and had the prestige of three successive terms as Prime Minister (or eleven years), it was evident that another election under existing laws would merely give his People's Progressive Party another plurality, if not an electoral majority. The London government therefore decided to decree for British Guiana a new pattern of election—proportional representation.

Jagan's strength lay in the countryside, where constituencies were relatively small. His opponents drew their support from the cities, where constituencies were larger. A majority of representa-

tives elected in geographical districts had given the PPP control of three successive legislative assemblies, and therefore the legal right to form three governments, with a full complement of ministers. Under proportional representation it was hoped by London that the larger city constituencies would shift the political balance to the two opposition parties.

After a bitter general strike and a reign of arson and assassination designed to soften up the large and militant membership of the PPP and drive it from office, an election under proportional representation was held on December 7, 1964, when 96 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots. The PPP increased its share of the total vote to 47 percent. While this was less than a majority of the votes cast, the party had a larger vote than either of the opposition parties.

Acting under orders from London, the British Governor of British Guiana declared Dr. Jagan's Premiership at an end and called upon the leader of one of the minority parties to form a government.

There were three noteworthy aspects of the Jagan expulsion. First, the move was made at the behest of Washington. Second, it was made immediately after swift and decisive United States action had saved the pound sterling from probable devaluation. Third, the move was made with the concurrence of a Labour Party government, which is theoretically opposed to imperialism-colonialism.

People's Progressive Party leaders are democratic socialists. They believe that action at the polls and in parliament can win independence for a colonial people and establish socialism. For fifteen years Dr. Jagan and his associates have campaigned on that platform, have formed three successive governments, and have moved decisively to the Left. Washington and London joined forces in 1964 as they did in 1953 to proceed by anti-constitutional means to prove that the PPP assumption that socialism can be established by gradual and legal action is erroneous.

Evidently, if a socialist government is to be established in the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro has found the key that will open the door to independence and socialism.

BOOKS

SOCIALISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN CUBA

BY EDWARD BOORSTEIN

Cuba, Socialisme et Développement, René Dumont. Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1964.

Progressives and socialists in the capitalist countries can be forgiven if they sometimes get puzzled about economic developments in the socialist countries. They know that socialism is superior to capitalism and has tremendous achievements to its credit. Yet they also hear about economic difficulties—problems with agriculture, false steps and switches in plans, faults in organization. From far away it is not easy to know what to make of these difficulties. How serious are they? To what extent do they result from errors? How and why do errors occur in a system based on planning? Do

they indicate incompetent leadership?

Any book that sheds light on these questions, that engages in an honest, realistic analysis of the problems of socialist construction and economic planning can only be welcomed. *Cuba, Socialisme et Développement* by the distinguished French agronomist René Dumont is such a book. Professor Dumont, who teaches Comparative Agriculture at the Sorbonne, is extremely well informed about revolutionary Cuba. He has visited the island several times as an invited consultant to the Cuban Government. He has tramped over farms, poked into the files of statistical bureaus, and talked to a wide range of people, including, evidently, key economists and most of the top leaders of the Revolution. His book is studded with keen insights and analyses. And Dumont does not pull any punches. He is absolutely frank in calling attention to what he regards as errors and giving his judgments

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of the technical abilities of the leaders of the Revolution.

I think that to be most useful this review should treat Dumont's book with the same frankness with which he deals with the Cubans and their problems. So it has to be added that the book also has some flaws. Dumont seems to forget that by the time he was writing his book a lot of dust had settled, and that it was not so easy for the Cuban leaders to see as clearly at the time of decision as he can now. Many of his criticisms are justified, but he makes them too severe and absolute. This is not just a matter of historical fairness, but of really coming to grips with the problems. Dumont, in my opinion, underestimates the complexities of the future, just as he does the difficulties of the past. Most of his recommendations make good sense. But he presents them too rigidly and extremely without leaving enough room for the countervailing considerations which must be remembered if one is to avoid hopping from one extreme to another.

Dumont begins his book with an excellent discussion of the economy of Cuba before the Revolution. The whole Cuban economy was geared to sugar and the United States. The United States took away from Cuba all initiative for the development of its own economy. The economy that resulted was incredibly wasteful of resources, unstable and, for quite some

time, stagnant. The sugar industry employed about four to five hundred thousand people during the harvest which lasted some four to five months a year. After the harvest came the *tiempo muerto*—dead season—and mass unemployment. Along with idle labor went wasted land. The sugar companies, owning enormous estates, held large amounts of the most fertile land in Cuba as a reserve and on the land they did utilize put in little effort, so that Cuban sugar yields were among the lowest in the world. Cattle raising was also based on extensive methods of agriculture practiced on large *latifundios*; a few cowboys took care of huge herds which roamed over thousands of acres of uncultivated natural pasture. The whole Cuban economy rode up and down with sugar—up with wars and international crises and down with peace and depression and recession in the United States. The Cuban economy did not grow at the rate required to keep up with the increasing population. The sugar harvest was larger in 1925 than in 1955, while the population more than doubled within this period.

The industries placed in Cuba by American, occasionally by other foreign interests, looked impressive to the eye but did very little to solve the economic problems. They were based on foreign machinery and, with a few exceptions, foreign raw materials and technicians. The mines were callously exploited

in line with foreign interests rather than those of the Cuban people. For example, the nickel plant at Nicaro was opened during World War II and closed down afterwards until the Korean War again made it useful to the foreign owners.

The Revolution came bringing with it land reform and setting off a chain of events that culminated in nationalization and socialization. The climax came in the summer of 1960 when the large oil refineries—Esso, Texaco, and Shell—refused to accept Soviet crude oil obtained in exchange for sugar. Cuba “intervened”—took over—the refineries during the last few days of June. In early July, President Eisenhower cancelled what was left of the 1960 quota for Cuban sugar in the United States market. A few weeks later the Cuban government nationalized the bulk of large American-owned property in Cuba: sugar mills, electric power and telephone companies, oil properties. In September, the Cuban branches of American banks were nationalized. And in October, nationalization was extended to the remaining sugar mills and banks (with the exception of two Canadian banks, soon purchased) and practically all other large or medium-size industrial, commercial, and financial enterprises, as well as railroads, port facilities, and many movie houses and hotels.

Dumont is a little unhappy about the rapidity and drastic extent of the nationalizations.

Wrestling with the problem of how to keep economic disruption during revolutions to a minimum, he comes back several times to ways of softening revolutions and keeping things orderly. He begins by wishing that the United States had not passed up the “unexpected opportunity” offered by the Cuban Revolution “of revising their policy vis-à-vis the south of their continent.” Later he mentions Chinese experience with mixed enterprises and says that the Cubans might have moved more slowly and with greater discrimination in the nationalization of Cuban and European, as opposed to American, enterprises. Then he plays with such ideas as obtaining progress in agriculture in the underdeveloped countries through a tax on idle land. And finally, he talks of an international body to reorganize the world economy on a new basis, with the developed countries, both capitalist and socialist, collaborating under the direction of this organism to solve the problems of the underdeveloped countries.

Concern with the problem of minimizing the disruption caused by revolution is of course worthwhile. But Dumont makes things easy by overlooking clashes of interest between different groups and classes. He overestimates the freedom of action of the participants in the drama and underestimates the extent to which developments occurred because of the very

logic of the situation. American interests were so omnipresent in Cuba that the revolutionaries, if they were to do anything significant, were bound to collide with one or another of them. Given the dominant forces in the United States government, what could be expected from it in the event of such a collision? The properties of the American companies covered such a large and strategic sector of the Cuban economy that nationalizing them was willy-nilly a long step toward socialism. Many of the Cuban-owned enterprises were so intertwined with the United States economy that they might just as well have been United States-owned: sugar mills, most of the larger manufacturing plants, import houses, and retail stores, heavily depended on imported goods. Many of the Cuban businessmen became hostile as the Revolution developed and engaged in sabotage, so that there was little choice but to nationalize.

There were also overprecipitate nationalizations, not forced by events. Evidently forgetting the principle that before throwing out dirty water one should make sure of a clean supply, the Ministry of Internal Commerce abruptly nationalized the private central market of Havana and only then proceeded to create an organization to replace it. The resultant difficulties in distribution lasted for some time. With what many thought was excessive zeal and a lack of realism, small shops for the repair

of shoes and watches were nationalized and their operations consolidated into large central workshops, presumably to make better use of scarce supplies. It became almost impossible to get shoes repaired, and when a watch was turned in for a minor examination it disappeared for weeks in some distant *consolidado*. But the whole problem of over-hurried nationalizations cannot be discussed in general terms without giving rise to misunderstanding. What can be regarded as mistakes in nationalization policy touched only secondary aspects of the economy and are not responsible for the main difficulties facing it. The main nationalizations were intertwined with the whole development of the Revolution.

The catalogue of Dumont's disagreements with the economic measures and methods of the Revolution is long, but the flavor can be gotten from several of the more important examples:

- The Cuban revolutionaries have indulged in "dangerous generosity" and financial imprudence. They raised rural purchasing power too rapidly. They set out in the early months of the Revolution, without a care about capabilities, on an overambitious, overcostly program to build housing for agricultural workers. In 1963, they spent several million pesos in beautifying one of the swankiest streets in Havana in preparation for an architects' congress to be held there.

- The conversion of practically all the cooperatives into state farms is considered by Dumont to be one of the most serious mistakes of the Revolution. The state farms suffer from being too gigantic, which makes them almost impossible to manage. The fact that the workers on these farms receive fixed wages eliminates proper incentives and controls. Dumont counsels a return to cooperatives in which payment would be proportional to the work of the individual and the profits of the group.

- The diversification of agriculture after the land reform was disorderly, poorly managed. Sugar was downgraded, the amount of land devoted to it was reduced, and the cane that remained was not given proper care and cultivation. These factors plus bad weather caused a sharp and costly drop in sugar production after 1961 when the harvest hit a near record level.

- The Cuban economy is too much organized along over-centralized, bureaucratic administrative lines, as though all the different units that make it up were simply separate departments of one gigantic enterprise. These units operate on budgets fixed at the beginning of the year, much as does any government office. They receive their budget allocation regardless of whether they are doing their work well or poorly. They are governed by administrative decree and controlled by bureaucratic-type inspections. It would

be better to cut them loose from most of the bureaucratic lines, setting them up as separate, financially autonomous enterprises.

It is worth taking up these points one by one. I would focus the question of generosity and financial imprudence differently from Dumont. What was done in the early days of the Revolution is not as much of a mistake as he thinks. Before the Revolution rural earnings were on the order of \$100 per capita per year. What could the Revolution do—let the rural population continue to starve while many in the cities enjoyed an easy existence? Why does Dumont limit his vista to rural purchasing power and fail to consider the possibility of raising taxes on the city well-to-do to make up for some of the increased money in the countryside? Also, in the early days of the Revolution there was still heavy unemployment and excess capacity in the cement and construction industry. The construction of rural housing was not, from a true economic point of view, as costly as he thinks it was. Politically, these measures showed the people that the Revolution meant business in working for their welfare, and this helped provide it with unflinching support. Having said all this, it remains true that there has been considerable imprudence in handling finances and foreign exchange; and although it has been decreasing, it dies hard. I happen to have

worked in an office located on the street that was being fixed up for the architects' congress and could only gulp when I saw what was happening.

Dumont is supported by other experts in his contention that many of the state farms are far too large for efficient management. And in principle he is right in his preference for co-operatives over state farms. I would venture, however, that he exaggerates the importance of the practical difference; neither organization will work the way he would like it to until some time passes and the techniques of organized work and other skills are more developed and widespread than they are today in Cuba. And aside from the question of size, there is something to be said for leaving things the way they are. One of the problems in Cuba has been too many organizations and re-organizations. The state farms also have one advantage of no small importance in a country with as hard a problem of organization as Cuba: with fixed wages, the accounting is easier.

Although Dumont lays greatest stress on the problem of co-ops vs. state farms, the most serious economic error of the Revolution was underestimating the importance of sugar. This error will, before its consequences fully peter out, cost more in foreign exchange than one likes to think about. It happened in part as a result of inadequate discussion and cross criticism of major decisions; in

part because of the general exaltation during the early days of the Revolution when everything was possible quickly, including more sugar on less land. But this exaltation intoxicated not only Cubans, but also most foreign experts. Dumont himself admits that he overestimated the possibilities of progress in increasing cane fields. It took a while to realize that diversification of agriculture using idle labor and land was one thing and the production of more tomatoes and cucumbers at the expense of sugar was another. Events—the development of balance of payments difficulties—furthered a better understanding of the problem. It is also fair to note that in his discussion of this problem, Dumont is not telling the Cuban leaders anything new. The error was recognized and analyzed in Cuba, and corrective measures were taken, well before Dumont's last visit.

Dumont's criticisms of over-centralization and the bureaucratic type of organization are well-taken. Under this type of administration things go wrong and it is often impossible to tell why, to fix responsibility. Everything gets lost in a bureaucratic mess. With organization on lines of financial autonomy, there are no gaps in the chain of responsibility. If an enterprise produces a product it cannot sell—for example if a mine produces chrome ore with an unacceptable proportion of impurities—the financial sanction will be automatic and quick. It will not

be able as under the bureaucratic system of control to "ful-fill" its plan indefinitely in an irrational way.

Yet as one who has argued many times in favor of the financial autonomy type of organization, I think Dumont goes too far with it. He forgets that before 1962, the difficulty was the opposite one. Then the Cuban economy was managed as an agglomeration of separate independent little economic fiefs. These different units were reluctant to submit to central control, for example of foreign exchange expenditures, although twice as many dollars were going out as coming in. The biggest weakness in the management of the Cuban economy was that little attempt was being made to understand and manage it as a whole. The error in sugar policy in good part stemmed from this weakness. Over-centralization is in part to be explained as an over-reaction to the previous free-wheeling. It would not do to over-react again. Dumont suggests that enterprises be given great freedom to procure the supplies they need in an open market and that rationing of consumer goods be eliminated quickly. This, for a country as pressed by balance of payments difficulties and scarcity of certain goods as Cuba, would be over-reaction.

Even though one may disagree with Dumont on a number of points, his discussion serves a good purpose. He touches in my opinion on one of the

keys to good practical work in economics when he says that one must have "humility before the facts." There could in Cuba be a little less emphasis on verbal theories and more respect for results. An economy can no more be talked into working right than the motor of a car.

On the other hand, the very fact that Dumont finds it necessary to criticize so many things, from the inefficiency of volunteer workers in the coffee harvest to the failure of students to study enough, should give him pause. There are times when failings cannot be considered to be the simple result of errors but rather reflections of the background of a whole society. Dumont calls attention repeatedly to the lack of capacity of various officials. But according to the Spanish proverb, *Hay que arar con los bueyes que hay*—you have to plow with the oxen you've got. With whom would Dumont replace these officials?

I would like to end this review with a small attempt at a perspective. Any economist who has worked in both capitalist and socialist societies cannot fail to be impressed with the tremendous superiority of socialism. It removes obstacles and opens up unlimited possibilities. But a socialist economy does not work right automatically. It has to be run right.

How it is run depends on the level of education, technical skill, and organizing ability of

the people—not just a few technicians but the whole people.

A certain amount of groping and floundering in trying to determine the right direction to give the new economy is almost inevitable. There is a severe limit to the extent to which this can be done in advance and on the basis of general principles. Many things have to be thought through creatively on the basis of the concrete situation in which the country finds itself at the time it begins to construct socialism—not just the economic but also the political and military situations, not just the internal but also the international situations. Many things cannot be really known until they are tried and tested.

Economic errors and difficulties have occurred in all the socialist countries. Let us hope they can be reduced or eliminated in the future. But an immaculate birth is still to come.

Cuba lived under slavery until about 1885 and imperialism

until 1959. This explains many things. The Cuban *campesino* does not have the European peasant's knowledge of how to care for property, but he does not have the European's narrow prejudices either. He mistreats the clutches on the new truck, but he is learning. Under the old setup he would not have had a truck to mistreat.

In the exuberance of the early years of the Revolution many people both in and out of Cuba expected short-order miracles. There aren't any. We should avoid going to the opposite extreme. Cuba is infinitely better off than she was before the Revolution, even with all the difficulties. And the issue there does not hinge on whether she will have a spectacular economic upsurge in the next two or three years—the chances are she won't, but will simply show modest improvement. In about, say, five to ten years, however, the full benefits of socialism for Cuba will really begin to show themselves.

It's not my fault if reality is Marxist.

—Che Guevara

Americans think that terrible things have happened in Cuba. It has fallen into the hands of the people who live there.

—Mort Sahl

REBEL VOICES

BY HARVEY O'CONNOR

Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology, by Joyce L. Kornbluh. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1964. 419 pp. \$12.50.

In *Rebel Voices* we have labor history written as it should be—by those who made it. Joyce Kornbluh has served more as master of ceremonies than historian, but her commentary at the beginning of each chapter catches fire from the voices of the Wobblies themselves, as they tell in song and story the movement of a great organization—the Industrial Workers of the World.

Already the IWW has disappeared into the mists of legend and there was danger that only a romantic glow would be left of their memory. In what must have been a labor of love, Mrs. Kornbluh has applied high scholarship and, what is more important, the “poetic understanding” which Wallace Stegner insisted is needful in the chronicler of a movement so dynamic, colorful, and revolutionary. The result is a handsome volume whose 11-by-8½-inch pages af-

ford scope for hundreds of cartoons, photographs, and illustrations, and hundreds of excerpts from the Wobbly press.

This, in a way, is a record of the anonymous. Mrs. Kornbluh searched diligently, and usually in vain, for biographical information about the men who reported the facts of working-class life in the IWW press. But aside from a few luminaries such as Big Bill Haywood, these were migratory workers — here today and gone tomorrow — leaving nothing more on the written page than their cry of protest, their hope in solidarity, their dream of a world that could be fair.

The mark of the migratory underscores nearly all the history of the IWW. These were the men who felled the timber, hewed the ore, laid the tracks, built the dams, and manned the ships — men without homes, without women, without ties except to each other. If they scorned the vote and all the tricks of parliamentarianism, what could be expected of wandering workers who lacked a permanent residence? If they mocked the government and proclaimed their anti-patriotism, what was to be expected of men whose

Harvey O'Connor is the author of many books, the latest of which is *Revolution in Seattle*, published in 1964 by MR Press.

only contact with the majesty of law and order was at the end of a policeman's billy, a sheriff's gun, a militiaman's bayonet? And when they went to jail by the hundreds and thousands in defense of their right to speak and to organize, it was no great sacrifice for them; the jails, prisons, and stockades were not much different from the bunkhouses of ten thousand camps or the "jungles" by the railroad tracks where they ate and slept in the open while on the endless march toward the next job.

This is not to ignore the great strikes of the textile workers in Paterson, Lawrence, and other Eastern cities. But these were more mass rebellions against wage-slavery in the industrial warrens; once the forces of law and order resumed control, the workers returned to the mills leaving no lasting trace of organization. In the main the great years of the IWW were from 1915 to 1919 when they dominated the logging camps and the harvest fields — a short period in labor history but one that has left a glorious record of working-class solidarity and militancy. The Wobbly span is indeed brief, compared with that of the A F of L, from the uncertain beginnings in 1905, arching to its zenith around 1917-1918, and then fading out in the 1920's. But in the 1920's, even the A F of L, despite the sturdiness of its craft consciousness, was reduced to mere islands of unionism in a sea of open shoppery. And the flame of the IWW,

nourished by generations of patient socialist and syndicalist propaganda, flared up again in the Great Depression within the body of the new unions of the CIO. These unions adopted as their own the great Solidarity Forever song of the IWW, summarizing as it did in verse and sonorous cadences the philosophy of radical industrial unionism. Even today the strains of Solidarity can be heard, sung feebly and rather shamefacedly in reunions of piecard artists—some-what perhaps as roly-poly Labor MP's sing The Red Flag in the hallowed chambers of the Houses of Parliament. A tradition dies hard—perhaps the feeling of Solidarity Forever is better rendered nowadays in Dixieland jails to the words of We Shall Overcome.

As a onetime member of Lumber Workers Industrial Union 500 in the logging camps of the Pacific Northwest, I scrutinized with special care Chapter 9 of *Rebel Voices*. And here is authentic history, written by lumber workers themselves, describing their lives and hopes, with an understanding foreword by Mrs. Kornbluh who, although no lumberjack herself, has brought to her task the needed poetic understanding. T-Bone Slim, the laureate of the logging camps, here delivers The Lumberjack's Prayer, and Anna Louise Strong paints unforgettable word pictures of the Centralia loggers who defended their hall with shot and shell. My old friend Ralph Winstead describes the

lives and problems of lumber workers, from his own horny-handed experience. Winstead later became editor of construction magazines for the master class, but true to his Wobbly heritage came back to the movement and spent his last years seeking the would-be assassins of the Reuther brothers. He cracked the case—how the goons escaped is a story that probably never will be told.

The chapter headings in *Rebel Voices* tell, in short, the history of the IWW: The Philosophy of Industrial Unionism; With Folded Arms—the Tactics of Direct Action; Riding the Rails: IWW Itinerants; Soapbox Militants; Free Speech Campaigns; Joe Hill, Wobbly Bard; Bread and Roses: The 1912 Lawrence Textile Strike; Paterson: 1913; Organizing the Harvest Stiffs; Lumberjacks: North and South; Down in the Mines; Behind Bars: War and Prison.

So much of our labor history has gone down the drain; of many radical newspapers we know only the names, for not a single copy has survived. We can be grateful to Jo Labadie and Agnes Inglis, the collector and the librarian, who gathered and preserved so many of the Wobbly newspapers, leaflets, pamphlets within the shelter of the University of Michigan Library. Without their labors, Mrs. Kornbluh would have produced a thin volume indeed. Tardily, other libraries are beginning to realize the value of this rich but fugitive literature and are seek-

ing it out, but unfortunately much has been lost forever.

We leave *Rebel Voices* with a quotation from Frank Little, the one-eyed, half-Indian General Executive Board member of the IWW, discussing the war in 1917:

"If we oppose the draft, they'll run us out of business," Richard Brazier had said.

"They'll run us out of business anyway," insisted Frank Little. "Better to go out in a blaze of glory than to give in. Either we're for this capitalist slaughterfest or we're against it. I'm ready to face a firing squad rather than compromise."

Frank Little was prescient. They dragged him out of a Butte hotel in the copper miners' strike and strung him up on a railroad trestle.

If *Rebel Voices* is labor history as it should be written, then Robert L. Friedheim's *The Seattle General Strike* is labor history as it is written. Here are traced the origins, conduct, and aftermath of the first general strike in the United States. The dates, names, and occurrences are generally correct; the only flaw is that the interpretation is haywire.

Friedheim concludes: "Essentially, the Seattle general strike is the story of an organization which for a short period escaped from the domination of its pro-

The Seattle General Strike, by Robert L. Friedheim. University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1964. 224 pp. \$5.00.

gressive leadership, and without Duncan and his cohorts in control, the organization was caught up in momentary passion and temporarily got out of hand." The "organization" is the Seattle Central Labor Council (A F of L) and James A. Duncan was its secretary. In brief, Friedheim contends that the "radicals" got hold of the Council for a brief period and precipitated the strike of 1919.

The trouble with this interpretation is that Friedheim has allowed himself to be victimized by Cold War obsessions which cast "radicals" in the role of bad guys who managed for a few short weeks to trip up the good guys and launch the Seattle labor movement into a disastrous debacle. Had he looked clearly at the facts as seen in 1919 rather than through the distortions thrown up by a generation of McCarthyite hysteria, the honest scholar within him would have discarded such a preposterous thesis. Let us glance at the bare facts:

The shipyard workers had gone out on strike for higher wages and faced a solid barrier of hostility erected by the shipyard owners and the government which gave them their wartime contracts. The shipyard unions then appealed to their brothers in the labor movement to show their solidarity, join in a general strike, and thus force the owners and government to negotiate. With hardly a dissenting voice the Central Labor Council authorized its local unions to vote on

this proposal and, in separate, closed meetings, the locals so voted, mostly by overwhelming majorities.

How then did the Central Labor Council "escape from the domination of its progressive leadership?" Friedheim contends that this happened because Secretary Duncan and "his cohorts" were in Chicago at the time. And what were these cohorts up to in Chicago? Why, they were attending the famous convention to plan a national general strike to free Mooney and Billings from the sentence of death! Friedheim contends that if these same leaders had been in Seattle they would have vetoed the idea of a local general strike for an economic end, although they were willing to travel 2,000 miles to foment a national general strike for a political end. The notion is so absurd that one wonders how Friedheim could have allowed himself to be so trapped by his anti-radical bias.

Duncan and "his cohorts" away in Chicago are presumed to be the "progressive leadership." But when one examines the list of delegates to Chicago, it becomes apparent that most of them were "radicals." Conservatives wouldn't travel that far to plan a general political strike; fact was, they were at home on the floor of the Central Labor Council when the strike vote was taken, and most of them also voted for the general strike in Seattle.

But how can a scholar stray

so far in his interpretation of facts? Really, it is not too difficult if one wears blinders. The magnificent display of class consciousness in Seattle in 1919 cannot be explained within the context of A F of L craft separation. It was the result of a generation of patient propagandizing by socialists within the trade union movement, abetted by the mystique of the general strike weapon as popularized by the IWW. But Friedheim never bothered to consult the rich socialist and Wobbly press published in Seattle for a generation before the general strike. He mentions, in passing, that Duncan had been a member of the Socialist Party and that Harry Ault, editor of the *Union Record*, the first trade union daily in the country, was reared in a socialist family in a socialist colony on Puget Sound. Here were clues that a scholar might well find valuable in understanding that tremendous burst of postwar passion that characterized the Seattle general strike.

After the strike, Friedheim contends, the IWW set out to destroy the Seattle labor movement. Source? The *Industrial Worker*, the Wobbly weekly published in Seattle? No. The *Union Record*, the official A F of L daily? No. The source, incredible as it may seem, is the labor spy reports paid for by the Associated Industries, the Seattle open-shop employers' agency, and other employers. Even our scholar warns that these reports in the main were wildly exag-

gerated, but such is his bias against radicals that he is willing to credit them when it serves his purpose.

To be fair to Friedheim, it must be conceded that he gained many of his impressions by talking to the few remaining leaders of the general strike still alive 40 years later. But they, too, now see the strike through the miasma of a generation of the type of trade unionism typified by Dave Beck, who rose to be the boss of the Seattle labor movement in the 1930's and continued until sent to prison for mixing unionism and business too openly. Many of these men now look back rather shamefacedly to what was really the glorious and triumphant moment of their lives, so long ago, in 1919. And so, to Friedheim, they apologized, rather than explained.

The recording of authentic labor history is an exacting and frustrating task. Official labor history is fairly well charted, from convention proceedings, statements by officials, and accounts in the press. How dull it is! The virtue of *Rebel Voices* is that Mrs. Kornbluh went to the reports of rank-and-filers themselves. But these, alas, are fragmentary and it must be admitted that the radical press in the old days was sketchy and improvised. Whether the advent of professional newspapermen as editors of the labor press has represented a real advance is highly dubious; the voice of the rank and file has been stilled.

Nevertheless the labor histor-

ian gets help from unexpected quarters. Against the short and simple annals of the IWW, for example, we have Harold M. Hyman's *Soldiers and Spruce: Origins of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen*. This is the story of the Army's own war in the Pacific Northwest to break the IWW strike in the woods in 1917. It is recorded thanks to General Brice P. Disque, head of the Spruce Production Division of the Army, who kept a diary, files of correspondence, and of course the publications of the LLLL. Here we get an upside-down version of the great lumber strike and its aftermath, as seen by the Army, The Department of Justice, and the lumber operators. Everywhere in the background lurks the dread bogey of the IWW, but we never learn just where they were, who they were, and what they did—only that they existed as a horrid nightmare for the generals and operators in their segment of the war to make the world safe for democracy.

Little did the Wobblies pulling their hit-and-run strikes, slow-

downs, and ingenious guerrilla tactics realize the consternation they had created in the highest ranks of government. To the Army, the Department of Justice and Labor, and the State Councils of Defense, backed by armies of sheriffs and police, this was a strike that threatened the very outcome of the war, for the country depended on spruce, not metal, in those days, to make planes. And the Wobblies stood astride the sources of spruce. The problem was difficult; it was easy to indict and imprison leaders, but spruce could only be cut by loggers, and they demanded the eight-hour day and human living conditions before they would work.

Hyman has recorded the anguish and trials of those on top; the nature of his source material of course precludes him from describing how things looked from below. And there is the ultimate irony that he robs the Wobblies of their glory in winning the eight-hour day in the logging camps. According to him, it was all due to General Disque. Nevertheless, he has contributed insights into the great strike in the woods and has given invaluable leads for some labor historian to write the real story of one of America's most memorable and dramatic union struggles.

Soldiers and Spruce: Origins of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, by Harold M. Hyman. Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, 1963. 341 pp. No price given.

THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORY

By W. H. Ferry

We print below additional comment on "The Triple Revolution" initiated in the November issue of MR.—*The Editors*

The Crowleys' admirable analysis concludes on an unwarranted note of optimism. The anarchy they propose is a hope, not a theory of society that will meet the requirements of an increasingly complicated world.

With the Crowleys, I realize that it is ingenuous to expect progress in economic organization and cultural and political life commensurate with the achievements of the machines we so adroitly hitch together. Some will think that depraved is too strong a word for the current situation, and they may be right; yet the emergence of material poverty and evidences of moral poverty, North and South, from Birmingham to Chicago to Dallas to the rhetoric of the recent vacuous campaign indicate that we Americans are in more brutalized condition than we have been willing to admit. At any rate, there is no doubt about wholesale apathy, hatred, boredom, anomie, and other psychic ailments in the community.

There is, perhaps, a certain inevitability about such a result when one considers technological achievements on which the United States has lavished most attention and cash. One is the dark alchemy of thermonuclear and biological warfare. Whether we are willing to admit it or not, these alchemistries show that our policy is genocide, if need be. Another achievement is Telstar. It was only a few days after its launching that we understood that we had nothing worth while saying via this remarkable medium of communication, so it was not hard for the military to establish first claim on it. Third is cybernation itself. In offices and on factory floors men see their jobs being

One of the signers of "The Triple Revolution," W. H. Ferry is Vice-President of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

performed by cybernated equipment far better than they can perform them, with psychic effects yet to be measured. These achievements remind us both of the debased uses and the high promise of cybernation. The computer scientists have a useful word, GIGO, which summarizes the possibilities of the new technology. GIGO means garbage in, garbage out: that is to say, if you put bad programs into a computer you get bad results. If we give bad or even indifferent instructions to our technology, we cannot expect anything but bad results.

This is the world before us, beset by novelty on every hand, already deeply perturbing to the individual personality, changing by the hour, promising mainly the unexpected, and founded on a false doctrine of man.

The central issue is whether we can bring our technical achievements under political control, in the interests of compassion and rationality, and put them to the service of man rather than the other way around. This control has never yet been achieved, nor even tried. Technical advance has seemed a self-evident good, and has been encouraged to go according to its own imperatives. The results are all around us, from the slums and dirty air of megalopolis to the great bombs. The issue is whether we can reconstruct our political and social ideas with something like the speed at which we pursue far more frivolous objects, like supersonic jets and the silent automatic backscratcher.

The Triple Revolution aimed to startle readers into an appreciation of the increasing dominance of technology in respect to war, prejudice, and economic machinery. In retrospect, I fear it merits passing marks only. On its central and fateful implication, that our virtuosity in megadeath weaponry is carrying us into calamity, The Triple Revolution produced only a twitter of comment. The memorandum asserted that cybernation was daily compounding the difficulties in coping with the race revolution; but this too was drowned almost at once in clamor about discrimination against white workers, the uneducability of Negroes, and similar claptrap. Even the central emphasis on the inevitable effects of cybernation on employment and the entire structure of political economic theory was diminished into a temporal and trivial contention about "paying people to do no

work.” We sought to delineate the closing of one era and the opening of another, full of promise and novelty and hazard. It is a majestic theme; but if we did not elicit a majestic response, the fault must be as much ours as that of our critics.

All the evidence is that we are entering the technological epoch before we have begun to understand or heal the wounds, psychic and economic, of the industrial epoch just closing. Jacques Maritain said, “Spirit never manages to keep pace with the rapidity of the development of matter.” In view of the radical alterations in every circumstance of the common life, the need for a radically new theory and practice of political economy is inescapable.

I do not say that the formulation of such a new science is easy, considering the vapors of musty slogans that will continue to be thrown up against it. I say that it is the nation’s most important intellectual and political task, surpassing in urgency any of the other issues on which we are expending our treasure and thought.

A SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY VIEW

By Nick Simon

In their earnest effort to see “beyond automation,” the Crowleys feel it necessary to “formulate a realistic program” for social change. In some seventeen bristling pages, they advance a policy and a program which, like the very latest cybernated tool, automatically renders all previous social thinking obsolete. It seems to this writer that a more appropriate adjective than “realistic” would be “surrealistic.” The Crowleys have forsaken Marx for Dali.

Their basic thesis is the allegation that the cybernation revolution is liquidating labor power so rapidly that it is no longer possible to look upon the working class as potential bearers of the revolutionary torch. In fact, they believe, this torch has already fallen, by default, into the hands of a new class, a

"true class," the lumpenproletariat. Deliberately shelving the historical definition of the term as used by Marx, the Crowleys substitute a definition which augments the dregs of society with the "hardcore unemployed," members of minority groups in the foreground of the civil rights battle, and assorted peaceniks who protest in one form or another against the various maneuvers of the warfare state.

It would be fruitful to subject this heterogeneous mass of rebels without a cause to microscopic analysis, but let us for the moment go along with the assertion that this is a true class with a "homogeneity of experience [which] produces concerted actions without need for elaborate theory or formal organization. They and they alone," to quote further, "can settle for nothing less than the transformation of society and the transformation of man. . . ."

It is possible that a serious sociological analysis of the new Crowley lumpenproletariat would indicate that its revolutionary potential exists only as part of the wish-fulfillment process. But granting the attributes for the sake of the argument, a logical and reasonable question might be: "Where do they go and how do they get there?" Perhaps anticipating some such troublesome inquiry, the Crowleys had the foresight to dispose of the matter in advance by the simple expedient of asserting that "[the abundant society] points away from private ownership but not toward . . . collective ownership; rather, it suggests that the fully automated productive complex, operating independently to supply whatever people may demand of it, needs no ownership nor management at all. Who owns the air?"

With this four-word bit of rhetoric, the Crowleys obviously believe they have spiked any further need to inspect the image of their future society. In a phrase, they manage to equate an exceedingly complex creative process with the envelope of gas which hugged the earth long before man was even a gleam in nature's eye. This is somewhat like finding a functional parallel between the ocean and the ships on its surface.

If we assume that in the Crowleys' surrealistic system all human beings have equal access to the means of wealth, production, and distribution, the matter of "ownership" might be con-

sidered moot. But to discard the idea of some human directive process with a glib phrase, conjures up the fantastic image of an automated sorcerer's apprentice setting production units in motion; assorted products grinding out of the mill; and piling up at the exits waiting for a consumer to scoop up his share. Who presses the button when there is too much?

As a matter of fact, who presses the button when the supply of raw materials begins to peter out? Who presses the button when someone discovers that the damned thing is pouring out products that nobody wants to scoop up? Who presses the button which assembles other production units required by new circumstances? Who presses the button which brings in the required supplies of raw or other materials not available or producible within the geographic limits of the country? Or do the Crowleys perhaps see as the most exciting leisure-time pursuit of their new society a new game possibly entitled, "Button, Button—Who Gets to Press the Button?"

By simply postulating "an altogether new type of society," the Crowleys apparently imagine we can be ushered into it with not a thought given to the very real urgency of adequate organization. Actually, the very nature of the transformation cries out for a form of organization to effect the single revolution with triple requirements. It must be capable of prying loose the dead hand of private ownership from its grip on the means of production; it must be capable of replacing, as Engels said, "the government of persons . . . by an administration of things;" and it must be sufficiently powerful to nullify any possibility of the "pro-slavery rebellion" foreseen by Marx.

Before suggesting an old alternative to "the altogether new type of anarchy" which the Crowleys unhesitatingly advance, it should be noted that they are not oblivious to the danger of reaction. They point out, and rightly so, that "the dangers of a limited revolution are frightful and too little understood." They clearly see "in the rise of the extreme Right a response to the threat" of the social disorder fated to follow in the wake of the nuclear-powered automation process. They "have no illusions about [the] plans . . . of the capitalist class." If they truly have no illusions about the nature of the foe, then certainly it is of

extreme importance to consider adequate methods of dealing with it.

The Crowleys have, however, seen fit to eliminate the working class as the basic element in any revolutionary change. Who or what, then, is capable of dealing with the "pro-slavery rebellion" they have not discounted? In the absence of any clues to the contrary, one is forced to visualize the "lumpenproletariat" in the role. Once again fantasy fills the breach. One is forced to invoke the image of a lumpen avant-garde materializing spontaneously before a threatened bank of computers, possibly with guitars in position. The imagination rampant adds a charming Joan Baez who at the given moment barks the command—"Sing!" The forces of reaction melt away as the soaring strains of "We Shall Overcome" whistle about their ears.

Sarcasm, of course, is no reply to the sincere, even if weird, thought-processes of the Crowleys. Note such an outrageous imprimatur as "We find it no less reasonable to postulate a functioning society without authority, than to postulate an orderly universe without a god." Do the Crowleys really believe that the physical laws which keep the planets from bumping into each other can be equated to the socially-produced relationships of human society? Certainly the rotation of the earth takes place with no human authority at the controls, but imagine the New York subways without a humanly-planned schedule. Or, for that matter, imagine a disaster in those subways.

Speaking for the Socialist Labor Party, this writer concludes that neither Marx nor DeLeon have been invalidated by the Crowleys' efforts to blaze new trails. Despite their "realism" it seems evident that they still share a common denominator with all other leftist groups who pay lip service to the demand for a new social order, but who *never* come through with any specific proposals as to the nature of the "force" which Marx called the "midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one." And he added, significantly, "It is itself an economic power."

The Socialist Labor Party's program of Socialist Industrial Unionism, rooted deep in the logic of Marxism and developed by DeLeon is apparently unacceptable to the rest of the Left, even though that Left has never offered any alternatives that

got beyond a sort of disembodied call for a socialist society. I am reminded of a characteristic incident during the national campaign when Clifton DeBerry, the presidential candidate of the SWP spoke at Stanford. He plugged for socialism and, instead of telling us how to get there, concluded his talk with a list of petty demands which included, for instance, a call for a stirring increase in the minimum wage to two dollars an hour. At this point, the writer asked Mr. DeBerry to assume that his audience was no longer interested in "immediate demands," but was ready to accept a socialist program. What, he was asked, was the program? The answer is still to come. He did suggest that if we really wanted to know, we could all come down to SWP headquarters and there only we would be made privy to what is apparently a heavily guarded secret.

Never having accepted Socialist Industrial Unionism in the first place, the Crowleys now, in effect, reject it again on the grounds that a working class dispossessed by automation is physically not in position to "take, hold, and operate" the means of production and distribution for the benefit of society as a whole. This, I believe, is a *reductio ad absurdum*. It seems clear that if the socialist revolution is not accomplished before most of the workers have been jettisoned by capitalism and rendered helpless, to boot, by what the Crowleys see as "paralysis" induced by capitalist manipulation of the "newly-deciphered genetic code," then all of us had better begin to pick out the bed of spikes on which to sweat out the industrial-feudal night inherent in the circumstances.

Despite the cynicism of the Crowleys, we are rapidly approaching the appropriate social conditions necessary for getting the Socialist Labor Party's program its hearing. Even with automation's rapid consumption of labor power, workers alone still operate the national workshop. Even a cursory glance at the heretofore glacial conservatism of union publications betrays the mounting concern with the dread job-killer. They are vulnerable and they know it. It remains for a socialist movement worthy of the name to bend every effort to steer this vulnerability into the path of common ownership. Whether it seems difficult, or impossible, reason dictates that those in positions of *power* are alone

capable of applying the revolutionary lever. Even the most flexible imagination bogs at the surrealistic picture of somehow recruiting the engineers, scientists, skilled workers and unskilled, who still man the works through the spontaneous combustion of the lumpenproletariat. Rebellious activity may certainly be the forte of at least a portion of the latter but it is the kind of activity more closely related to the theory of uncertainty than to the requirements of getting rid of capitalism.

In contrast to the fearless anarchy advocated by the Crowleys, the Socialist Labor Party reaffirms the logic of Socialist Industrial Unionism. Unceasing political action is the requisite forum in which to keep educating for socialism, i.e. the formation of the revolutionary unions without which no change is possible. These unions fulfill the triple requirements referred to earlier: (1) the revolutionary lever; (2) the physical framework through which socialism can be administered democratically; and (3) the ultimate power capable of dealing in a civilized manner with any reaction which raises its head.

There are many who will raise the usual anti-SLP charge of "dogmatism," "sectarianism," and the now stereotyped accusation that we of the SLP don't do a damned thing except talk. We intend to persist, however, in a course of action that seems to us brighter with promise than the vague appeals for a new society, no matter how insistent, which have never been backed by any tangible program. For more than half a century, outside of the Socialist Labor Party, it has been a "pie in the sky" campaign with no ladders in sight except for the program of Socialist Industrial Unionism.

America seen from abroad is rich and arrogant. She is great in military prowess but weak in principle. . . . She seems weak in principle when her so-called bastions of strength are corrupt reactionary regimes such as Iran and Formosa. . . . Our measure of the amount of foreign aid we give is not dependent on the extent to which the recipient nation is moving toward a free society but its anti-Communist attitude. . . .

The arrogance we feel at home reflects in part the uneasiness of the rich who are surrounded by slums and know not what to do but police them. The psychology of fear and apprehension produces the radical right. . . . The world's diversity is indeed exciting. Are we really afraid to compete? Do we really want to drop the bomb in the name of freedom and produce a holocaust which will destroy all freedom?"

—*Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, July 25, 1964*



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In 1938, the first Westinghouse Time Capsule was buried at the New York World's Fair. Time Capsule II will be buried there on October 16, 1965. It will contain twice the amount of material, including an extensive bibliography chosen by the "distinguished 14-man Time Capsule II Selections Committee, whose chairman is Dr. Leonard Carmichael, retired secretary of the Smithsonian Institution." All the foregoing by way of introduction to the fact that an MR Press book has been selected for the Time Capsule; our congratulations to William Appleman Williams whose book *The United States, Cuba and Castro* will soon be buried—and our assurance that we will keep the book alive, above ground.

January saw the death of two very different but equally admirable women whom we had the privilege of calling our friends. On January 2nd, Rose Russell, for years the leader of the New York Teachers Union, died after a long illness. She was a wonderful person, full of warmth, charm, and courage. And then on January 13th, Lorraine Hansberry died at the early age of 34, also after a long illness. Lorraine Hansberry was the author of two Broadway plays, "A Raisin in the Sun" and "The Sign in Sidney Brustein's Window." She was also an outspoken socialist and an ardent fighter in the Negro liberation movement. We reprint in this issue, beginning on page 588, her talk at MR's 15th birthday celebration last May. We mourn the passing of two fine human beings.

There is a glaring error in the January Review of the Month for which we have neither explanation nor excuse. The sentence beginning on line 10 of page 532 should read: "According to the official figures, of this increase \$17.4 billion represented net export of capital from the United States." And the last sentence of the same paragraph should read: "In other words: during the period 1950-1963 American corporations extracted from the rest of the world \$12 billion more than they invested in it, while at the same time adding \$28.8 billion to their foreign holdings." These corrections do not involve any changes in reasoning or conclusions.

Note for readers in the Northwest area: Scott Nearing's lecture tour will bring him to Gresham, Oregon for the regular Sunday evening meeting of the Methodist Federation for Social Action on February 21, and for a seminar on the next three evenings. For full details, write to Mrs. F. H. Neuenschwander, 321 N.E. Bridgeton Rd., Portland, Oregon.

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